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have been that the proffered evidence did not show what that standard was.
Yet, if the real issue is faced a new constitutional right may be struck. The
theme of Justice Harlan in the Smith case points the way by demonstrating that
where constitutional freedoms of expression are at stake, one cannot in keeping
with due process be condemned for dealing in forms of expression the com-
munity at large tolerates.
W. J. L.
EXTREMELY LONG AND UNREASONABLE DELAY IN SENTENCING CONVICTED
CRIMINAL DIVESTS COURT OF JURISDICTION
Relator pleaded guilty in the Bronx County Court to second degree
robbery in February 1953, and sentencing, scheduled for April 1953, was not
imposed until November 1959.1 Whether or not the delay was of such an
unreasonable length of time as to divest the court of jurisdiction over the
convicted criminal was the center of controversy in this habeas corpus pro-
ceeding. The events that occurred between the time of scheduled sentencing and
actual sentencing were as follows: Before the April 1953 sentencing date,
relator was tried in the same court for first degree robbery. This ended in a
mistrial. He was then ordered to Westchester County to face a third charge of
robbery pending against him. He pleaded guilty to this charge and was sen-
tenced on May 27, 1953, to the Elmira Reception Center for a term not to
exceed five years. He was paroled in October 1955, but prior to this time the
Superintendent at the Center had sought to learn from the Bronx authorities
the disposition to be made of five warrants lodged against relator as detainers,
one of which pertained to the February 1953 conviction. Before relator's
release, all of these warrants had been withdrawn. This supposedly led the
relator to believe that the February 1953 proceedings against him had been
abandoned. Out on parole for little over a year, the relator was returned to
jail and released in April 1958. Within a few weeks he was arrested on two
felony charges, pleaded guilty in Bronx County Court, and was sentenced to
Riker's Island. At this time a motion was made by the District Attorney to
have the relator sentenced upon the conviction of February 1953, and he
received five years probation which he began to serve upon his release from
the Island in May 1959. Within a few months he absconded, his probation was
revoked, and he was sentenced to Sing Sing Prison for a maximum of three
years. In his writ for habeas corpus, relator claimed that by virtue of the
delay, the Bronx County Court lost jurisdiction over him, and the sentencing
on the February 1953 conviction was void. The Supreme Court, Dutchess
1. Relator was 17 years old at the time. For a complete record of the charges and
convictions lodged against him from March 1952 to November 1959 see the report of the
State of New York Dept. of Correction, Div. of Identification, Albany, N.Y., dated Novem-
ber 11, 1961, in Respondent's Brief, People ex rel. Harty v. Fay, 10 N.Y.2d 374, 179 N.E.2d
483, 223 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1961).
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County, dismissed the writ and the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed,2
permitting an appeal. Held: reversed. 3 Where sentence is postponed by an
extremely long and unreasonable delay, a court will lose jurisdiction over the
convicted criminal. The circumstances which will determine the unreasonable-
ness in each particular case, were sufficient here to be rendered unjustifiable.
People ex rel. Harty v. Fay, 10 N.Y.2d 374, 179 N.E.2d 483, 223 N.Y.S.2d
468 (1961).
At common law a court lost its jurisdiction over a defendant by the
expiration of its term. If the sentence had not been imposed before this expira-
tion, it could not be imposed at all. 4 Many of the states have statutes in
derogation of the common law pertaining to the procedure to be followed by
the courts in sentencing convicted criminals, and New York is among them.5
It was relator's contention, 6 and it seems to be substantiated by considerable
case authority,7 as well as the text writers,8 that the general rule prevailing
in the United States today is that a criminal court has the duty to impose a
sentence upon the convicted criminal within a reasonable time, and that if an
indefinite and unjustifiable length of time elapses after conviction the court
will lose its jurisdiction over the prisoner. The opposite view does not recog-
nize any loss of jurisdiction under circumstances similar to those presented by
the instant case, unless the defendant has taken some action to challenge the
delay. 9 This view has the effect of shifting what is usually considered the court's
duty to the prisoner, and it has often been strongly criticized.'0 It was rejected
by the Court in the instant case, and it is stated that no waiver of the claim
of lack of jurisdiction exists merely because the defendant has not challenged
the delay of the court before sentence is finally handed down.'"
2. 13 A.D.2d 538, 214 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1st Dep't 1961).
3. Judge Fuld concurred in the result, but not the opinion of the Court written
by Chief Judge Desmond.
4. See generally, Hogan v. Bohan, 305 N.Y. 110, 112, 111 N.E.2d 233, 234 (1953);
Rudd v. Hazard, 266 N.Y. 302, 306, 194 N.E. 764, 765 (1935).
S. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 471, 472, 482.
6. Relator's Brief, People ex rel. Harty v. Fay, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., People v. Cahill, 300 Ill. 279, 133 N.E. 228 (1921); Willard v. State,
67 Old. Cr. 291, 94 P.2d 13 (1939); Grundel v. People, 33 Colo. 191, 79 P. 1022 (1905);
Commonwealth v. Maloney, 145 Mass. 205, 13 N.E. 482 (1887).
8. 5 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure 372 (1957).
9. This is the view that obtains in the Federal Courts. See Miller v. Alderhold, 288
U.S. 206, 211 (1933), where the Court held that "in a criminal case, where verdict has been
duly returned, the jurisdiction of the trial court . . .is not exhausted until sentence is pro-
nounced, either at the same or a succeeding term." It was further stated that in case of
a delay the defendant had no cause to complain unless he had moved for a timely sentenc-
ing and that a failure to do so was a waiver.
10. See Smith v. State, 188 Ind. 64, 67, 121 N.E. 829, 830 (1919), where the Court
stated: "There is no reason or authority for saying that an accused must not only do
what the law requires of him, but that he must go farther and compel the Court to perform
a plain statutory duty, if he would protect himself from the motives of the Court's failure
to act."
11. People ex rel. Harty v. Fay, supra note 1, at 337, 179 N.E.2d at 484, 223 N.Y.S.2d
at 470: "Our state nowhere imposes on a defendant any duty to demand sentence and the
question of retention or loss of jurisdiction should not depend on the activity or non-
activity of the defendant."
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The policy of the courts in New York State has been to look with strong
disfavor upon unreasonable delays in criminal cases,'12 and it has been stated
that the courts lack the power to defer sentence indefinitely.18 This can be
seen from a study of three sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section
471 provides that the court "must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment";
section 472 provides that the "time appointed must be at least two days after
the verdict, if the court intends to remain in session so long, or if not, as remote
a time as can reasonably be allowed"; section 482 provides that "if no sufficient
cause appear to the court why judgment should not be pronounced, it must
thereupon be rendered."' 14
As these sections illustrate, the court need not set a date for sentencing
a convicted criminal within the term of the convicting court; but jurisdiction
over the criminal can survive the expiration of the court's term. Since the court
can establish the date of sentencing within a "reasonable" time it can be
assumed in the instant case, that the time between the relator's conviction
(February 10, 1953) and the date set for sentencing (April 9, 1953) was a
"reasonable" time. But relator was not sentenced on this date because of his
removal to Westchester County to face another charge. Since section 482
clearly provides that judgment "must" be rendered on the date so fixed, a
vigorous argument was made by the relator that even if the court did not lose
jurisdiction by virtue of the inordinate delay, still the sentence imposed was
void because it did not conform to the specific procedure stipulated by the
three pertinent sections. That is to say, judgment was not rendered on the
specified date, as it "must" be, and therefore any further attempt to sentence
the relator would be void. Conceivably, the Court might never have reached
the question of what constitutes an unreasonable delay sufficient to divest a
court of jurisdiction, if it had based its decision on the lack of conformity with
this specific procedure. It may be that Judge Fuld, who concurred in the result,
but not the opinion, believed that the decision would more wisely have been
grounded upon this argument of the relator.
12. See People v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 391, 171 N.E.2d 310, 208 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1960).
13. Accord, Hogan v. Bohan, 305 N.Y. 110, 111 N.E.2d 233 (1953); People ex rel.
Prosser v. Martin, 306 N.Y. 710, 117 N.E.2d 902 (1954); People v. Cioffi, 1 N.Y.2d 70,
133 N.E.2d 703, 150 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1956).
14. In Hogan v. Bohan, supra note 13 at 112, 111 N.E.2d at 234, the Court considered
these sections of the code and stated: "the plan is unmistakable; the Court is afforded time
to reach a decision and pronounce judgment, without running the risk of losing jurisdiction
of the defendant by the expiration of its term-as was the case at common law .... But
pronounce judgment, impose sentence it must." It must be noted at this point that there
exists a possibility of confusion in construing sections 471, 472, and 482 with respect to the
difference, if there is to be considered any, between "judgment" and "sentencing." Sections
471 and 472 speak only of "judgment," whereas section 482 speaks of "rendering judgment
or pronouncing sentence." The opinion in the instant case states that "[slentencing is the
entry of judgment in a criminal cause." It thus appears that the Court has used the terms
in such a way as to make any distinction between them of no significance to the instant case.
It further appears that the applicable sections of the Code have also used the terms synony-
mously, and it is to be noted, finally, that no distinction is made by either relator or re-
spondent.
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Whether or not the instant case furnishes the most desirable opportunity
to pass on the issue of unreasonable delay in sentencing, the holding of the
Court has brought New York State in line with what is asserted by the Court
to be the better reasoned view on the subject.' 5 The reasons that recommend
such a holding are persuasive: the orderly administration of the courts; the
fact that until judgment is rendered the defendant cannot be eligible for pardon
or commutation of sentence, nor can he appeal; and of course, the deferment
of the term of punishment merely extends the length of time after which
the defendant will be able to return to society or be eligible for parole. There
is little doubt that in many ways a delay can work hardship and injustice
upon the defendant. But there may be other considerations of at least equal
importance. It is to be noted that the Court has not really defined what is to be
an "unreasonable" delay-this is understandable since the term "unreasonable"
is susceptible of numerous interpretations. Also, there is the question of what
circumstances will "justify" a long delay. The Court does not list in advance
what these might be; this would, of course, be impossible. But it is not difficult
to predict that prosecuting attorneys will have no more difficulty in construing
"justifiable circumstances" than will defense counsels in discovering "unreason-
able delays." If the decision of the Court in the instant case had been based
upon noncompliance with the applicable sections of the statute, and the delayed
sentencing of the relator declared void on that certain ground, rather than
on the basis of "unreasonable delay," justice might yet have been achieved for
this particular defendant without opening the door to what may well prove
to be a flood of writs of habeas corpus from convicted criminals who are
suddenly aware of the possibility that their sentence may have been pronounced
after an "unreasonable delay" from the time of conviction. There may be more
desirable cases where it will be necessary to consider what would be an
"unreasonable delay." Such a case could arise under section 472 which deals
with the appointment of the time for pronouncing judgment. Under this section
it must be appointed at least two days after the verdict, or if not, "as remote
a time as can reasonably be allowed." A case where the appointment of the
sentencing or judgment date was delayed for an unusual length of time would
call for a determination of what would be an "unreasonable delay." But where,
as here, the date has been set for judgment, and, according to section 482
"must thereupon be rendered," but is not, is it really necessary for the Court
to go further than this obvious noncompliance with the statute to void any
subsequent sentencing? In spite of the Court's rationale and the admittedly
persuasive reasons given to support it, it seems undesirable to allow convicted
felons a cancellation of their debt to society on grounds that may indeed work
for a more orderly administration of the Courts, but which leave the question
of the public interest in some doubt.' 6 Submitted-that the public has an
15. Supra note 7.
16. It may be hoped that the relator will not furnish the typical example of the con-
141
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interest in the preservation of the deterrent effect of the sure and certain, as
well as expeditious and orderly, administration of criminal justice. It has been
said that "Justice is not a one-way street-that law-abiding citizens .and law-
abiding communities are entitled, at least equally with criminals, to the pro-
tection of the law."'1
J. P.M.
I MANSLAUGHTER THE SAME IN NEW YORK AND NORTH CAROLINA FOR PURPOSE
OF HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE
After defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, the
State filed an information at the time of sentencing which charged him as a
second felony offender. Previously, the defendant had been convicted of com-
mon law manslaughter in North Carolina. On the basis of these convictions,
defendant was sentenced under Penal Law section 1941 and received an
indeterminate term of twenty to forty years. After serving six years of that
term, defendant commenced this coram nobis proceeding on the ground that
the North Carolina conviction was not one which could form the basis of a
conviction under the New York habitual criminal statute.' Special Term denied
the application, and this decision was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate
Division.2 Held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. Though manslaughter in
North Carolina is a common law rather than a statutory crime, it is defined
as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice and without pre-
meditation,"3 which amounts to the same prohibition as under section 1049
of the Penal Law, and therefore, the North Carolina crime is a valid predicate
for second felony sentencing in this state. People v. Perkins, 11 N.Y.2d 195,
182 N.E.2d 274, 227 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1962).
Section 1941 subdivision 1 of the Penal Law states:
a person, who, after having been once or twice convicted within
this state, of a felony, of an attempt to commit a felony, or, under
the laws of any other state, . . . of a crime which, if committed within
this state, would be a felony, commits any felony, within this state,
is punishable upon a second or third offense, as follows:
If the second or third felony is such that, upon a first conviction, the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than
victed criminal who escapes sentencing on the basis of the rule laid down in the instant
case. The record shows (supra note 1) that since April 9, 1953, when the Bronx County
Court failed to sentence him he has been incarcerated almost continuously. His career in
crime includes charges of assault, rape, robbery, felonious assault upon a police officer,
possession of burglary tools, as well as parole and probation violations. If the delayed sen-
tencing of the relator in the instant case has worked an injustice, it does not readily present
itself upon a close reading of the record.
17. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 514, 137 A.2d 472, 483 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 1941.
2. People v. Perkins, 13 A.D.2d 998, 216 N.Y.S.2d 762 (2d Dep't 1961).
3. State v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 799, 11 S.E. 869, 871 (1922).
